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Abstract  Process tracing as a method in comparative politics usually aims at reconstructing 
socio-political macro processes. This entails the risk of structuralist or functionalist short-
circuiting, i.e. the results-driven ascription of actors’ preferences and strategies. To avoid this, 
one has to take actors and their particular logics of thought and action seriously. The article 
presents the cognitive map as a way to ground macro-political process tracing via actor-
centered micro analyses. Two cognitive maps taken from an analysis of the indigenous 
movement in Ecuador are used to discuss the added value, the possibilities and the limits of 
this methodological tool. 
 





When country case studies in political science do “process analysis” (Hall 2003: 391-395) or 
“process-tracing” (George/Bennett 2005: Chap. 10), they usually try to reconstruct socio-
political macro processes at the national level. Systematically speaking, the process tracing 
method aims at detecting the causal mechanisms or paths that lead to a certain outcome that is 
to be explained (Brady/Collier 2004: 300). This implies the necessity of what Anthony 
Giddens has called “methodological bracketing”: It is not enough to analyze the structural 
features of a social system and their changes over time; in a second step, one has to look 
closely at the (collective and individual) agents that act within this structural setting, but who 
reproduce or transform it at the same time (Giddens 1997: 342-343; cf. Rösener 1998: 119-
121). A perspective that, in line with structuration theory, refrains from giving epistemologi-
cal priority to either actor or structure may be able to avoid the paradigmatic debate between 
 2 
structuralists and methodological individualists at the level of meta theory (Sil 2000). Yet, the 




The aim of the present article is not deal with this question in any comprehensive manner. It 
sets out to propose and critically discuss only one particular methodological strategy that may 
help to underpin macro-political process analyses by including actor-centered micro analyses: 
the instrument of cognitive maps which are deduced from qualitative content analysis in order 
to be interpreted in a comparative manner. Originally developed in the field of psychology, 
the cognitive map approach was introduced in political science research quite some time ago 
(cf. Axelrod 1976a; Bonham et al. 1997; Hart 1977; Shapiro/Bonham 1973; Shapiro et al. 
1988). Its potential contribution to qualitative process analyses, however, has yet to be fath-
omed. In what follows, I will try to do this – not in an abstract form, but using the example of 
a completed empirical study that has applied, inter alia, this tool (Wolff 2008). In the study, 
the compilation, analysis and comparison of cognitive maps of different social movement 
organizations (of the unemployed movement in Argentina and the indigenous movement in 
Ecuador) deepened the process tracing of democratic crisis and conflict management in South 
America. In the present paper, the exemplary recourse to this specific study’s methodological 
procedures and empirical material serves illustrative purposes only; it is not possible to com-
prehensively present the case studies and process analyses. 
In what follows, I will first introduce the cognitive map approach and substantiate this presen-
tation by using the example of the study mentioned above (2.). Then, the potential and limits 
of using cognitive maps as an instrument of actor-centered process tracing are critically exam-




2 The cognitive map approach: A methodological introduction 
 
Cognitive maps represent particular interpretations of a specific policy problem. They are 
arrow diagrams where central concepts are linked through causal and quasi-causal assertions. 
                                                 
1
 Handbooks or textbooks on Comparative Politics usually focus their methodological remarks on the “method of 
comparison“ (Pickel 2007: 179; cf. Jahn 2006; Kneuer 2007) and thus tell us little about the ways and means of 
collecting the empirical data that is to be compared at a later stage. The advocacy of qualitative methods (and 
small-N comparisons) against the quantitatively oriented mainstream is particularly predominant in Anglo-Saxon 
publications (cf. George/Bennett 2005; Brady/Collier 2004); as this debate is mostly situated at the level of the 
philosophy of science, there is remarkably little information as to how intensive case studies should in fact ana-
lyze processes and actors. 
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They map how a distinct pattern of thought links aims and values, options for action and 
framework conditions (cf. Axelrod 1976a; Hart 1977; Shapiro/Bonham 1973). The basic idea 
is that properties and changes of the world “out there” – material and social structures, events 
etc. – have an impact on social life only in the way they are perceived and evaluated by social 
actors. Given the complexity of social life, all actors “have to form simplified, structured be-
liefs about the nature of their world” (Holsti 1976: 20). A cognitive map, then, is thought to 
(approximately) represent the interpretative scheme through which social actors filter real-
world events and structures, and connect them with their own actions and goals. This scheme, 
however, does not seek to reproduce the general world view of a particular actor, but only a 
problem-specific pattern of thought. As a descriptive instrument, the cognitive map requires 
the researcher to convert complex and potentially diffuse patterns of thought and arguments 
into a network of causal assertions; at the same time, it offers a technical tool to graphically 
depict the web of causal linkages extracted from qualitative content analysis (Bonham et al. 
1997: 222; Eden 1992: 262; Heradstveit/Narvesen 1978: 85). 
Initially, cognitive maps were used in political science to understand (and, in fact, predict) the 
behavior of individual persons, but in later studies the tool was applied to capture collective 
interpretative schemes that guide the actions and decisions of groups (cf. Shapiro et al. 1988: 
397-398). This raises the problem of the adequate textual basis from which to extract the cog-
nitive map of a collectivity via content analysis (Axelrod 1976b: 239-240). In the example 
used in the present article, the task was to understand the diverging strategies of different or-
ganizations and currents within a specific social movement. A problem-centered, semi-
structured interview was conducted with a leading representative of each of the selected or-
ganization. This interview, then, formed the basis for the content analysis. The assumption 
was that these interviews with single representatives of the organizations comprehensively 
represented the self-image and the world view of the respective group – obviously not an un-
problematic premise that had to be reflected and critically discussed in the analysis (see Sec-
tion 3). 
As a first step, the interviews were subjected to a structuring (qualitative) content analysis as 
proposed by Philipp Mayring. Initially, the “basic dimensions of structuring” (Mayring 1997: 
83) were established by way of a deduction from the research question. These, then, served as 
selection criteria for the inductive development of categories.
2
 Working through the interview 
                                                 
2
 In addition to the evaluation of change and continuity during the governments of the recent past (V1), these 
basic dimensions (variables) included: preconditions for social change (V2); perceptions of negative legitimation 
(V3); bases of and incentives for mobilization (V4); bases of and incentives for (protest-) alliances (V5); reasons 
for and triggers of divisions within the “camp“ of protest groups (V6); reasons for an orientation towards coop-
eration (with the state) and moderation in protest behavior (V7); reasons for an orientation towards confrontation 
(against the state) and a radicalization in protest behavior (V8). 
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material, arguments related to the different topics were identified, constituting the categories 
for the content analysis.
3
 Finally, the universe of arguments identified in the interviews was 
coded and arranged in a table for each organization. 
In a second step, these structured collections of assertions were scanned individually for each 
representative/organization in order to identify the central concepts and, subsequently, the 
(quasi-) causal linkages between these concepts. In the cognitive maps presented below all 
concepts are represented by boxes.
4
 Drawing on different typologies proposed in the literature 
(cf. Bonham/Shapiro 1976: 115; Hart 1977: 119), goals (immediate political aims), values 
(general, abstract aims), perceived events and determining factors (framework conditions), 
and options for action can be identified as important types of concepts. These different types 
serve as a rough systematization of the concepts, but, in the end, it is advisable to specify the 
relevant types of concepts depending on the problem and research question at hand. In the 
study discussed here the main concepts constituting the cognitive maps are: initial conditions 
(as part of the context), patterns of organization and operational strategies (as options for ac-
tion) as well as different concepts of goals, distinguished by the degree of immediacy (interim 
goal, aim, perspective). 
Every linkage between two concepts that was at least quasi-causal in character is represented 
as an arrow, while positive (“causes”, “leads to”, “contributes to”, “is necessary for”, “ena-
bles”) and negative (“impairs”, “constrains”, “diminishes”, “inhibits”) impacts are differenti-
ated (cf. Bonham et al. 1997: 223). In addition to definitely positive or negative arrows, it is 
also possible that two concepts are linked by different causal links. If a context condition is 
added that defines which impact is effective, this can be represented by a conditional link (in 
the cognitive maps below such conditional links are depicted as dashed arrows). 
To illustrate this procedure of developing a cognitive map, take the following example from 
the analysis of an interview with Blanca Chancoso (see also Hart 1977: 117–119). This inter-
view with a representative of Ecuador’s indigenous movement from the Andean Highlands 
(CONAIE/ECUARUNARI) served as the basis for one of the cognitive maps discussed be-
low. Asked for the bases of indigenous mobilization, Chancoso emphasized: “First of all, 
there is a situation of identity. We identify ourselves as indigenous. And even if, considered 
individually, we may be in better economic conditions, there is a bond that unites us, and this 
                                                 
3
 E.g., with regard to “bases of and incentives for mobilization” (V4), eight arguments were identified: the spe-
cific context of (economic) crisis (code 4.1 “crisis context”), state failure in the provision of basic (public) goods 
(4.2 “state failure”), resistance to political repressions (4.3), support by the state or external (international) actors 
(4.4), “need satisfaction/self-help” (4.5), “collective identity/ideology” (4.6), “political practices/representation” 
(4.7) and “protest and success experiences“ (4.8). 
4
 Different ways of designing (box, circle) and formatting (bold, highlighted grey) these concepts serve illustra-
tive purposes only. 
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is being indigenous. Everyone, in equal measure, suffers from discrimination, from the disre-
spect of one’s identity.” In a first step, this assertion was coded as category 4.6 (“collective 
identity/ideology” as basis of and incentive for mobilization). In a second step, the concept 
“indigenous identity (incl. experiences of discrimination & marginalization)” was developed. 
As depicted in the cognitive map reproduced below (see Figure 1), this concept was identified 
as an initial condition with a positive impact on the (action) concept “indigenous mobilization 
& organization”. 
In analyzing a given cognitive map, useful interpretive strategies include, first, the search for 
causal paths that run through the scheme. Such causal chains link the context and initial con-
ditions, options for action, immediate (intermediate) aims and general perspectives. Second, 
hierarchies and priorities are of interest: E.g., an option for action may stand out because it 
contributes directly to an aim (while other action concepts only impact aims in a mediated 
way); in addition to a concept’s position on the map, the number of arrows linking a concept 
with others signals its importance within the scheme. Third, mutually linked concepts can 
form clusters that may constitute virtuous or vicious circles through causal feedback loops. 
Fourth, an important question is whether the causal relations represented by the cognitive map 
combine to form an unambiguous and linear picture or contain contradictions and negative 
feedback loops (cf. Eden et al. 1992; Hart 1977: 119-121). 
 
 
3 Applying cognitive maps in process tracing: Potentials and limits 
 
The cognitive map is a tool for the micro analysis of (collective) actors. Within the framework 
of qualitative process tracing it scrutinizes whether and to what extent a certain macro expla-
nation makes sense from the perspective of distinct social groups: Do the patterns of action 
and perception as well as the logics of operation and reaction on the level of the single organi-
zation match the expectations that emerge from the macro perspective? This includes the 
question of whether social structures identified at the macro level can be discovered as 
“memory traces” (Giddens 1997: 69, 77) in the thoughts of specific actors.
5
 Thus, an im-
portant function of the cognitive map is (self-) control: The (graphic) reconstruction of causal 
relations from the perspective of the actors themselves helps avoid structuralist or functional-
ist short-circuiting, i.e. the results-driven ascription of actors’ preferences and strategies. 
                                                 
5
 As an instrument applied to broaden the micro foundations of a macro explanation, the cognitive map is not 
bound to a social theory as taught by Giddens. In much the same way, it can be used, for example, within a 
methodological individualist framework like James Coleman’s “macro-micro-macro model“ (cf. Jahn 2006: 263-
264). I owe this point to one of the journal’s anonymous reviewers. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
This said, the cognitive map is useful only within the established framework of a comprehen-
sive process tracing. Obviously, its role as a method of (micro) control depends on a given 
(macro) analysis that is to be controlled. On a more general level, a micro analysis based on 
cognitive maps requires detailed case knowledge: knowledge both about the actors studied 
and about the socio-political macro processes in which these actors are embedded, to which 
they react and which they help to shape. Thus, the whole idea is that the cognitive map ap-
proach should not replace, but rather complement the usual analysis of processes and actors 
based on secondary literature and primary sources. However, even such an embedded applica-
tion of cognitive maps encounters four problems that point out the limits of this instrument – 
yet, in part, these limits merely reflect general problems that apply to the scientific analysis of 
social subjects as such. 
A first problem affects any analysis that tries to infer the thoughts behind the speech from 
linguistic articulations: the question of authenticity. It is impossible to solve this problem, but 
case knowledge can be used to ask for incentives that may motivate “dishonest” assertions 
and to check assertions against observed actions of the respective (collective) actor (cf. Axel-
rod 1976c: 252-253). 
Second, as descriptions of collective patterns of thought, cognitive maps encounter the prob-
lem of representativeness. In the study which the present article refers to, the assumption was 
that interviews with single (leading) representatives reflect the dominant interpretive schemes 
of the given organization in a correct and comprehensive manner. Such a sweeping premise 
can only be justified if the textual basis as well as the interpretation of the cognitive map are 
controlled by means of the method of triangulation (Mayring 1993: 121; cf. Denzin 1978), by 
looking at further secondary analyses and other primary sources of the organization con-
cerned. This minimizes the risk that an individual (minority) pattern of thought is misleading-
ly treated as the (majority) scheme characterizing the collectivity. An even better way to deal 
with the problem of representativeness is to select documents as the textual basis of the cogni-
tive map – e.g., as an official declaration of an organization – which qua document type rep-
resent the collectivity’s “prevailing opinion” and which, in the best of cases, resulted from 
collective processes of deliberation and decision making. This, however, depends on the very 
practical condition of the existence (and availability) of such documents, and the question of 
sufficient substance concerning the problem and the research question of the analysis. 
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The highly interpretive character of the “deduction” of cognitive maps presents a particular 
challenge. More so than other tools of qualitative content analysis, the transformation of multi 
layered and frequently diffuse patterns of arguments into a limited number of concepts and 
causal links requires a process of massive reduction of complexity and aggregation. It is im-
possible to avoid that one’s own subjective predispositions and expectations shape this pro-
cess – especially because the deduction of cognitive maps depends on detailed case 
knowledge. Thus, it is advisable to include additional controls. These, for example, can be in 
the form of a complementary statistical analysis: Following the first step of the qualitative 
content analysis – i.e. before the deduction of the cognitive map begins – the interim results 
can be quantified. In the example used here for illustrative purposes, the collection of asser-
tions arranged according to the system of categories was quantified by counting the number of 
coded assertions for each category. This resulted in a table that displayed the number of en-
tries per category (argument) for all units (organizations).
6
 Given such a frequency distribu-
tion, it is then possible to systematically compare the patterns of arguments by the means of 
descriptive statistics. By comparing the frequency distribution of two organizations by means 
of a bivariate correlation analysis we are able to discern whether high and low values (entries) 
are assigned to the different arguments in a systematically similar way. Thereby one can con-
trol whether similarities and differences that result from the interpretive comparison of two 
cognitive maps are confirmed by corresponding statistical correlations. 
At the same time, such a complementary statistical analysis qualifies a fourth shortcoming of 
the cognitive map approach: As boxes and arrows remain unweighted, the relative importance 
attributed to specific concepts and causal links by the text is not reflected in the scheme. In 
addition, developing a cognitive map requires a process of aggregation that subsumes several 
arguments (and categories) under broad concepts. In this case, a frequency analysis can rein-
troduce certain differentiations lost in the process of “deducing” cognitive maps by simply 
counting and comparing the number of entries for each category. By comparing the frequency 
of entries across organizations, one can also estimate the relative importance of specific ar-
guments in the sets of assertions of different actors – an additional strategy to verify the solely 
qualitative comparison of cognitive maps.  
 
 
4 Cognitive maps in practice: Competing patterns of thought within Ecuador’s indige-
nous movement 
 
                                                 
6
 When a specific argument was rejected, it was counted as a negative entry. 
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In the remainder of this article, I will illustrate the potentials and limits of grounding qualita-
tive process analysis in cognitive maps by using the example of two schemes representing 
different currents within Ecuador’s indigenous movement. The maps originate from an empir-
ical study (Wolff 2008) which cannot be outlined in full detail within the realm of the present 
paper. Nevertheless, a short description of the context is indispensable in order to render the 
cognitive maps comprehensible. 
 
4.1 The cognitive maps’ context: A short abstract 
 
In the study mentioned above, the aim was to explain how contemporary democracies in 
South America that are characterized by mass poverty, extreme social inequalities and far-
reaching politico-institutional “defects“ are, nevertheless, able to survive even severe eco-
nomic crises, the escalation of social conflicts and political turbulences that regularly occur 
during such crises. The main case studies were recent crises in Argentina (2001/2002) and 
Ecuador (1999/2000). In order to explain the macro-political re-stabilization after the crisis, it 
was necessary, inter alia, to trace the process during which a particular “challenger” to the 
system who temporarily proved highly conflictive was politically “contained” or “tamed” in 
both countries: the unemployed workers’ movement in Argentina and the indigenous move-
ment in Ecuador. Complementing analyses of the general formation and evolution of these 
two “movement[s] of movements” (Colectivo Situaciones 2003: 73) as well as of their inter-
action with the political system, a series of cognitive maps was deduced from content analyses 
of interviews with representatives of different organizations and tendencies within the general 
(unemployed or indigenous) movement. These cognitive maps helped to understand the di-
verging behavior of the different sub-collectivities by looking at their respective (predomi-
nant) interpretive schemes. 
Following a spectacular first “uprising” of the indigenous peoples (levantamiento indígena) in 
1990, which catapulted Ecuador’s indigenous movement onto the stage of national politics, it 
quickly became the country’s most important social movement as well as the strongest indig-
enous movement in the region (Yashar 2005: 85; Van Cott 2005: 99). The movement’s organ-
izational core was the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (Confederación 
de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador, CONAIE), founded in 1986. Through its three 
regional federations ECUARUNARI (Andean Highlands), CONFENIAE (Amazonian Low-
lands) und CONAICE (Coast), CONAIE united the overwhelming majority of indigenous 
grassroots organizations. Ecuador’s deep division in three major regions is also reflected in 
the indigenous movement: As only a very small part of indigenous people live in the coastal 
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region, CONAICE is rather marginal; in contrast, ECUARUNARI, representing the Quichua 
who live in the Highlands, acts for the largest indigenous “nationality” that equals about 
three-fourths of the indigenous population; finally, CONFENIAE, unites a diverse spectrum 
of “nationalities” who, in part, comprise barely 100 members. The most important rival to the 
Catholic-dominated CONAIE is the federation of evangelical indigenous people FEINE (cf. 
Wolff 2008: 237-239). 
During the 1990s, Ecuador’s indigenous movement experienced a remarkable advancement 
politically (cf. León 1994; Pallares 2002; Selverston-Scher 2001; Van Cott 2005: Chap. 4; 
Yashar 2005: Chap. 4; Zamosc 2007). In periodic mass protests, CONAIE forced the respec-
tive incumbent governments into negotiations and concessions. Via the political party 
Pachakutik, which was founded in 1995 and is dominated by CONAIE, the indigenous 
movement quickly gained seats and votes within Ecuador’s democratic institutions. In the 
course of the economic crisis that escalated in 1999, the indigenous movement led the protests 
that escalated throughout the country which culminated in the toppling of elected President 
Jamil Mahuad in January 2000. Following the victory of Lucio Gutiérrez as the presidential 
candidate supported by the indigenous movement in late 2002, representatives of CONAIE 
and Pachakutik were part of the national government (as proper ministers) for the first time. 
The rebellion-turned-coup against Mahuad in 2000 and the electoral victory of Gutiérrez in 
2002 based on claims for far-reaching political change signaled a serious challenge to Ecua-
dor’s political system, its traditional representatives, strategic orientation and entrenched po-
litical practices (Wolff 2004; Almeida 2005). Yet, after taking office, President Gutiérrez im-
mediately changed course towards alliances with established political forces and an orienta-
tion toward the IMF and the US with respect to the economic and foreign policies. Conse-
quently, Gutiérrez quickly lost the support of all his allies among the indigenous and social 
movements (cf. Barrera et al. 2004). After having abandoned the government, the indigenous 
movement in general – and CONAIE in particular – proved heavily weakened, unable to mo-
bilize any significant resistance against the “traitor” Gutiérrez (Posso 2004). When Gutiérrez 
was toppled in April 2005 during renewed mass protests, the indigenous movements did not 
play a significant role. This crisis of a “challenger” who had proven highly able to mobilize 
resistance can be traced back, in particular, to dynamics of division and demobilization within 
the movement, dynamics that were effectively fueled by President Gutiérrez in a strategy of 
divide et impera based on clientelism and cooptation (cf. Almeida 2005; Beck/Mijeski 2006; 
Wolff 2007: 21-27; Zamosc 2007). 
In this context, some of the indigenous organizations were not willing to confront the gov-
ernment of Gutiérrez, while others were not able to mobilize significant support for protests 
 10 
against the president. CONFENIAE and FEINE pragmatically decided to cooperate with a 
government that, although it had broken all election promises in terms of macro policies, se-
lectively responded to certain issue-specific material claims of these indigenous organizations 
and their bases. In contrast, the leadership of CONAIE and Pachakutik, dominated by 
ECUARUNARI, declared Gutiérrez a “traitor” and sought to topple him with any institutional 
and extra-institutional means available. Thus, the actor-centered analysis of cognitive maps 
has to answer two main questions: Considering the strategies for and logics of action from the 
perspective of the different indigenous organizations, how can we interpret (a) the diametri-
cally opposed reactions of different groups’ tendencies within the indigenous movement to 
the government of Gutiérrez and b) the general proneness of the indigenous movement to 
clientelist offers and divide-and-rule strategies? In what follows, I will exemplarily present 





4.2 The cognitive map of CONAIE in the Andean Highlands (ECUARUNARI) 
 
The first cognitive map (see Figure 1) depicts the pattern of thought of ECUARUNARI, the 
Highlands branch of CONAIE.
8
 As a social movement or social movement organization, 
ECUARUNARI can be treated as a collective actor only with the usual reservations; this res-
ervation applies particularly to the indigenous movement because it is characterized by strong 
and relatively autonomous organizational structures at the local level rooted in indigenous 
communities (comunidades) (cf. Zamosc 2007: 16-17). Nevertheless, indigenous confedera-
tions like CONAIE at the national, and ECUARUNARI at the regional level are social entities 
that are capable of acting collectively and feature distinct (dominant) world views and inter-
pretive schemes, political positions and claims (cf. Van Cott 2005: Chap. 4; Yashar 2005: 
Chap. 4). Thus, organizations like CONAIE and ECUARUNARI can be analyzed as collec-
tives whose actions are shaped by collective (although always contentious) patterns of thought 
in much the same way and with equal qualifications as, e.g., political parties. 
Turning now to ECUARUNARI’s pattern of thought as represented by the cognitive map, 
there are six different vertical types of concepts: Initial conditions, patterns of organization, 
operational strategies, interim goals, political aims and the perspective constituting the general 
                                                 
7
 In the original study (Wolff 2008: Chap. 5.4) seven cognitive maps are included to cover the whole spectrum of 
indigenous currents and organizations in Ecuador. 
8
 The cognitive map is based on an interview with Blanca Chancoso, a historic leader of CONAIE from Ecua-
dor’s Andean Highlands, conducted on February 10, 2005, in Quito. 
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normative horizon. This yields six steps that make up the horizontal causal paths that run 
through the scheme. 
As initial conditions (1), “indigenous identity” and the common “unsatisfied basic needs of 
the indigenous communities” activate the processes of indigenous mobilization and organiza-
tion. The generalized rejection of “polity, policies & politics” – i.e., of the political system, its 
representatives and the general model of development – constitutes the shared point of depar-
ture that enables alliances with non-indigenous social forces (“protest alliances”; “political, 
‘mixed’ organizations”). The prospect of such alliances is limited however because it is only 
the common enemy and the rejection of the political and socio-economic status quo – and not 
some shared needs, claims or identities – that unite indigenous and non-indigenous forces.
9
 
As regards the indigenous part of the story, the picture is complicated as well as it is not only 
the common ground they share as indígenas but also the respective identities and needs of 
single indigenous peoples and nationalities that active and shape mobilization. This problem 
is verified by the arrow that leads from “particular identities & needs of indigenous peoples & 
nationalities” to the concept of “political attempts to divide & coopt”, a concept that, in turn, 
has a negative impact on “indigenous mobilization & organization”. Yet, the negative arrow 
that leads from “indigenous identity” to “particular identities & needs” shows that the com-




Now, these initial conditions yield particular patterns of organizations (2) and operational 
strategies (3). Both take place in two complementary dimensions. In the upper half of the dia-
gram, there are the purely indigenous processes of mobilization and organization; the com-
mon focus here is the socio-political claim to represent the indigenous population in social 
and political life. The lower half of the diagram includes, in addition, the dimension of a 
broad (party-) political organization that includes both indigenous and non-indigenous forces. 
CONAIE and ECUARUNARI represent the former, Pachakutik the latter. As for the opera-
tional strategies, these are divided into extra-institutional strategies of protest, and institution-
                                                 
9
 In Section 2, Chancoso was already quoted as identifying the “indigenous identity“ as the basis of (indigenous) 
mobilization. The second basis of mobilization – the initial condition “unsatisfied basic needs of the indigenous 
communities“ – rests on the assertion that it is “the basic needs of the communities” that constitute “a common 
interest that unites us”. The proposition that it is the shared rejection of “polity, policies & politics” – and only 
this rejection – that enables mixed “protest alliances” is substantiated by the following statement: “If one com-
pares the needs of someone living in the city with the needs of an indigenous person living in a rural area, they 
have no similar claims. But there is one point where we identify with each other, and that is the rejection of the 
policies of the state. This is what unites us: the desire to change the policy of this state.” 
10
 Cf. Chancoso’s following assertion: “Within CONAIE and ECUARUNARI, even if we are different peoples, 
we are exclusively indígenas.“ 
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al forms of participation on the national and local level.
11
 The strategy of establishing alterna-
tive “popular parliaments”, sustained by social and indigenous organizations is an additional 




This repertoire of complementary strategies for action in turn contributes to a series of tangi-
ble interim goals (4). Here, we can discern a cluster of positive interactions (highlighted in 
grey in the figure): Strategies of protest and participation, and political achievements like 
“constitutional reforms”, “recognition as political actor”, “material ‘responses’” mutually re-
inforce each other. A case in point is the establishment of state institutions specifically con-
cerned with questions of bilingual education (DINEIB), “indigenous health” (DNSPI) and the 
implementation of local development projects in indigenous communities (CODENPE). E.g., 
the establishment of CODENPE developed out of the recognition of indigenous peoples in the 
new constitution of 1998; it provided the indigenous organizations – and CONAIE in particu-
lar – with far-reaching competences for participation and self-administration; it thus rein-
forced the political recognition of the indigenous peoples; and endowed indigenous represent-
atives with institutional power and enabled them to respond to the basic needs of the indige-
nous communities (cf. Wolff 2008: 241, 245). While the constitutional recognition of the in-
digenous peoples and the establishment of CODENPE resulted from a combined strategy of 
protest (CONAIE) and participation in the Constituent Assembly (Pachakutik), the achieve-
ments in turn further increased the capacities for mobilization and organization of the indige-
nous movement. 
However, in the context of Ecuador’s actually existing democracy, the medium-term experi-
ences of the indigenous movement with these institutional achievements were rather disillu-
sioning. In the cognitive map, this is reflected by the fact that three further interim goals are 
deemed necessary for achieving a “democratization of democracy” that goes beyond limited 
                                                 
11
 In this sense, Chancoso distinguishes between CONAIE and ECUARUNARI as “exclusive organizations of 
the indigenous peoples and nationalities“ that have “a political position not limited to elections“, and Pachakutik 
as a “broader space that fulfills an electoral role”. With respect to both operational strategies (“protests/ 
levantamientos“ and “institutional participation“) Chancosos emphasizes that all of the achievements of the 
indigenous movements were achieved “by struggle, by proper efforts”: “We had to pay all the costs, the 
levantamientos, the mobilization of the people, our people had to mobilize to get something done.” At the same 
time, she highlights the complementary character of the two strategies which is represented by the joint impact 
on a series of interim goals in the cognitive map: Asked to evaluate the strategies of protest versus institutional 
participation, Chancoso argues that “the one takes nothing away from the other. Depending on moment and 
opportunity, you do one thing or the other.” 
12
 Therefore, a national alternative parliament was established in January 2000 before the “uprising“ against 
President Mahuad. It emerged from a series of “popular parliaments“ at the local level and was sustained, in 
particular, by the indigenous movement (cf. Walsh 2001: 175). 
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responses to indigenous claims:
13
 the ability to make “plebiscitary ‘appeals’” including the 
toppling of unbearable presidents by means of mass protests or direct popular referendums on 
vital topics; the “struggle against undemocratic practices”, i.e. against corruption, breaches of 
constitutional law etc.; and the extension of ‘real’ bottom-up “popular political participation” 
that is attributed, e.g., to those “alternative municipalities” that are governed by Pachakutik 
and rely on mechanisms of direct social participation (cf. Tituaña 2005). 
These interim goals contribute to three main aims (5) that pave the way for a perspective of 
fundamental social change towards “real”, participatory democracy and comprehensive and 
balanced socio-economic development (6). As it is particular to the indigenous movement, it 
is important that “territorial autonomy for indigenous communities” is designated as a goal in 
addition to macro-political concepts that strive for “indigenous representation & participa-
tion” and “general democratization”: The demand for political participation is thus comple-
mented by a claim for local self-government based on indigenous customs and practices.
14
 
The two arrows that lead to the goal of autonomy illustrate that success in this dimension de-
pends, on the one hand on top-down macro-political achievements of the indigenous move-
ment – i.e., on the constitutional recognition of collective indigenous rights – and, on the oth-
er on a bottom-up dynamic of autonomous local organization on the part of indigenous com-
munities. 
Three features of the cognitive map stand out. The first refers to the complexity due to the 
high number of concepts and causal links. This reflects CONAIE’s experience that indigenous 
mobilization often resulted in important political achievements, but that tangible improve-
ments for the indigenous population nevertheless remained limited. Hence, political strategy 
is not about taking a few steps towards the grand breakthrough, but a complex process with 
multiple steps and interim goals. Second, what is striking is the focus on the independent or-
ganization of indigenous peoples. The indigenous movement dominates the horizontal causal 
path in the center of the figure that leads to the crucial cluster (highlighted in grey). Converse-
ly, the role of non-indigenous (urban) movements and organizations is limited. Even though 
they are important for protest alliances, a broad (party-) political project and, thus, for a “gen-
eral democratization of democracy”, they are unreliable candidates as the dashed arrows 
show: The confluence of indigenous and non-indigenous forces is based on a common posi-
tion of objection; as the mestizo-urban forces share neither the specific needs of the indige-
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 Thus, Chancoso emphasizes: “We had the possibility to see, from within, how the political system works. And 
this has led us to insist more intensely on our right to demand change. Because it is not enough to occupy certain 
spaces in the administration.“ 
14
 According to Chancoso, in addition to the “struggle for real democracy“, indigenous goals include the defense 
of a “territorial space [...] in which the specific norms and rules of the respective community apply, in which the 
community has authority.“ 
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nous peoples nor their political project, alliances depend on the opportunistic behavior of the-
se actors and, thus, on specific political junctures (see note to Figure 1). Third, the negative 
feedback loops – via “political attempts to divide & coopt” – are relativized. Successful indig-
enous strategies of protest and participation evoke political divisions and attempts at coopta-
tion which have a negative impact on the unity and strength of the indigenous movement. Yet, 
at the same time, two factors limit the potential (of the government) to weaken the indigenous 
movement: The overarching indigenous identity diminishes the differences between the in-
digenous peoples and, thus, the basis for political attempts to divide the movement; in addi-
tion, the indigenous movement learns from its problems and failures with respect to its ability 
to withstand manipulatory strategies. 
Finally, the role of “external intervention” by international organizations and foreign govern-
ments as a disruptive factor is remarkable. Externally set sanctions and incentives limit the 
margin for change instituted by indigenous protest and participation at the national level. Ex-
ternally provided development funds serve as additional resources for political attempts to 
divide the movement and coopt representatives and sub-groups (if they are awarded to indige-
nous communities). By way of dialogue and protest, however, the indigenous movement can, 




4.3 The cognitive map of CONAIE in the Amazonian Lowlands (CONFENIAE) 
 
The second cognitive map (see Figure 2) represents the perspective of CONAIE’s branch in 
the Amazonian Lowlands, CONFENIAE. The contentious stance towards the government of 
Lucio Gutiérrez led to the public division of this confederation. The CONFENIAE leadership 
upon which this cognitive map is based
16
 represents the group of indigenous organizations 
from the Amazonia which remained close to the CONAIE leadership and was relatively re-
served vis-à-vis President Gutiérrez. Thus, the pattern of thought “of CONFENIAE” that is 
analyzed below refers to this dominant sub-group, only – a sub-group, however, that was cru-
cial for determining the confederation’s political stance. 
Again, the map’s concepts can be roughly divided into initial conditions, patterns of organiza-
tion, operational strategies, interim goals and aims. In the case of CONFENIAE, one single 
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 CONAIE campaigned against the extension of the World Bank project PRODEPINE, a project that, in large 
parts, funded the development projects implemented by the national development council for the indigenous 
population CODENPE (cf. Bretón 2005). This seems to be counterintuitive at first but is actually perfectly in line 
with this logic. 
16
 The empirical basis, in this case, are two interviews with CONFENIAE leaders: a short one with then 
CONFENIAE President Luis Vargas and a more extensive one with the Director of Territory, Eduardo 
Mamallacta. Both interviews were conducted on January 28, 2005, in Quito. In order to have text material that is 
comparable in length, both were analyzed together as if they were a single text. 
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causal path dominates the scheme (indicated in bold in the figure): This path is located in the 
upper part of the map, running from the “needs of indigenous nationalities & communities” 
via processes of indigenous organization, strategies for action and different interim goals to 
the “self-determined development of indigenous nationalities & communities in the Amazoni-
an region”. “Pragmatic/ needs-oriented organization” which appears as two national organiza-
tions that represent the interests of the indígenas of the Lowlands (CONFENIAE) and of Ec-
uador in general (CONAIE) constitute the center of this path. Hence, CONFENIAE conceives 
itself as well as CONAIE as an interest group that represents its own basis vis-à-vis – not 
within! – the political system.
17
 
The operational strategies correspond to this self-image: The main strategy is a “policy of 
propuesta”, i.e. suggesting precise proposals (e.g., of development projects) and remaining in 
a dialogue with state entities; targeted protests (“with tangible goals”) constitute a comple-
mentary strategy in the sense that extra-institutional pressure is, at times, necessary to make 
one’s voice heard. Thus, the levantamientos (uprisings) of the 1990s were intended to achieve 
the recognition of indígenas as legitimate and institutionally represented interest group: “Tar-
geted protests” provided the indigenous movement with a “political voice” and “institutional 
representation”. As suggested by the mediated impact of “targeted protests” through “’politi-
cal voice’ for the indigenous nationalities” on “policy of propuesta”, today, these hard-earned 





[Figure 2 about here] 
 
This being said, also the political achievements mainly serve to achieve and implement “de-
velopment projects etc. for the communities” (this is the only aim of the “policy of 
propuesta”). At the same time, such development projects are promoted from the bottom up 
by self-help initiatives of indigenous organizations at the local, regional and national level. In 
addition, “’Sympathizers’ in the government” (as well as external funds from development 
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 The most important elements of this causal path are indicated by the following quote by Mamallacta: “The top 
priority of CONFENIAE is to ensure that all of the organizations of the different nationalities develop positively, 
to defend the ancestral territories of all nationalities of the Amazon region and to assist with the implementation 
of development projects for the nationalities [...]. It is the fundamental guiding principle of our work to act as a 
guarantor for the interests of each and every nationality.“ 
18
 This causal chain is based on Vargas’ and Mamallacta’s argument that the levantamientos of the 1990s aimed 
at, and resulted in, “effective achievements“ (Vargas). Thanks to these achievements – e.g., institutions like 
CODENPE, DINEIB and DNSPI (see above), and the constitutional recognition of indigenous (collective) rights 
– the indigenous nationalities gained a political “voice“ (Mamallacta). Thereby, today, CONFENIAE can act 
“like every Ecuadorian citizen” claiming institutionalized “collective rights” and pursuing her interests “on the 
basis of proposals” (Vargas). 
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cooperation) also make a contribution. Notably, the origin of these “sympathizers” is left in 
the dark. E.g., in the interview, President Gutiérrez – the “first president from the Amazonia” 
(Eduardo Mamallacta) – and his indigenous Minister Antonio Vargas are mentioned as con-
tact persons for CONFENIAE. Yet, neither is there an explanation as to why and how the 
indigenous groups from Ecuador’s Lowlands became supporters of the government of Gutiér-
rez, nor as to what extent CONFENIAE intentionally enforced (or is able to enforce) the rise 
of such sympathizers and corresponding government orientations. Accordingly, no factor in 
the figure has an impact on the concept “’sympathizers’ in government”. Yet, an indirect link 
is suggested by the cognitive map: Indigenous organizations attract attention as possible polit-
ical supporters or, at least, as cooperative forces who tolerate the government due to the com-
plementary strategy of protest. The external role of “sympathizes” in the map, thus, points to 
the fact that CONFENIAE’s self-description as an ordinary interest group that relies on pro-
posals and dialogue leaves out an important dimension: An indigenous organization that nei-
ther uses formal institutions (parties, elections) nor informal protests to make use of its central 
resources of political power – the representation of a relevant number of (potentially) mobi-
lized people – has very few chances in the procedures of political lobbying. 
These are also the three elements that constitute the differences in strategic orientation of 
CONAIE’s Lowlands and Highlands branch. First, the limitation of the strategy of protest: 
For CONFENIAE, protest is an instrument applied selectively in the interest of achieving 
tangible goals; protests “for the sake of protest” and levantamientos that serve particular polit-
ical interests of single leaders and/or politico-ideological goals lead to the instrumentalization 
of the indigenous movement, the cooptation of indigenous representatives and the destabiliza-
tion of democracy. As a result, the reproduction of the “system” – i.e., of “the same as always 
in power” (Luis Vargas) – is supported. Second, the qualification of extra-institutional (pro-
test) strategies is not accompanied by an upgrade of the strategy of gaining influence through 
formal institutions; participation via democratic institutions is not mentioned. This corre-
sponds to the self-image as an interest group. This also applies to the third element, the mac-
ro-political claim of representation, which is limited to their own grass roots level, the needs 
of the indigenous communities and their demand for self-determined development.
19
 
Given these three features, the cognitive map confirms general evaluations concerning the 
particularities of indigenous mobilization and organization in the Lowlands (in contrast to the 
Highlands): the pragmatic political aim to achieve tangible results; the informal strategy of 
gaining influence through quasi-corporatist negotiations; and the susceptibility to clientelist 
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 Thus, in the interview, Mamallacta emphasizes that the indigenous nationalities “do not want any more grand 
speaches [...], but development projects for their communities“. 
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strategies of incorporation on the part of the state which is determined by these two character-
istics. The scheme suggests that it is precisely the critical evaluation of the reality of Ecuado-
rian politics that helps to explain the susceptibility to the critical issues mentioned above: 
Formal political participation is rejected as it would imply the inclusion in institutions shaped 
by cooptation, instrumentalization and clientelism; yet, the alternative of a “policy of 
propuesta”, as an informal mode of participation, is even more prone to such mechanisms. 
The difference is that clientelism and cooptation operate by means of deals within the political 
system in the “game” of formal institutions, whereas informal mechanisms of inclusion result 
in direct outputs for the grass-roots level as exchanges of support for (material) favors. The 
former implies negotiations about political appointments and ideological positions; the latter – 
even if just as “dirty” in procedural terms – is always oriented at tangible benefits for the or-
ganization’s local bases. 
This reflects the experiences of Amazonian indigenous peoples. They have never been able to 
trust the formal institutions of the state (if these were present at all) and have always had to 
find pragmatic ways to deal with “external actors” in their territories – be they representatives 
of the state or of international (oil) companies (cf. Yashar 2005: 109-130). All this occurred in 
a context of threatened subsistence where immediate problem-solving strategies are predomi-
nant compared to abstract political programs. According to these needs as well as the experi-
ence with external intruders, political ideologies are considered to be particular strategies of 
opportunistic participants in Ecuadorian politics: “individual/ particular interests” and “politi-
co-ideological goals” lead to “processes of top-down organization” and, ultimately, under-
mine the idea of a “common ‘political project’ of the indigenous”. The reason is that such a 
“political project” of the indigenous movement, according to CONFENIAE, is not ideological 
and, in the end, it is apolitical; its aim is to further classical socio-economic development 
(promotion of infrastructure, education, business) while respecting politico-cultural self-
determination and legally protecting the respective nationalities and their territories. In this 
sense, the dimension of CONAIE that corresponds to the notion of a “pragmatic/ needs-
oriented organization” has a crucial (and positive) position in the cognitive map. In contrast, 
the concept of “politico-ideologically oriented organization” – that also refers to CONAIE – 
leads to counterproductive activities that undermine CONFENIAE’s aims. 
 
4.4 The cognitive maps’ contribution to understanding the indigenous movement 
 
From the very beginning, the indigenous movement in Ecuador had a dual character (cf. León 
1994): On the one hand, it aimed to protect and promote specific interests of the indigenous 
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population in general and of different indigenous peoples and communities in particular; on 
the other hand, CONAIE’s political project comprised a broader and long-term goal of pro-
found social change in the name of the poor majority of Ecuador’s population. This dual char-
acter implied two tensions: between a particular/indigenous and a general/social agenda, and 
between a short-term/problem-solving and a long-term/programmatic perspective (cf. Collins 
2004: 53-57; Beck/Mijeski 2006: 17; Almeida 2005). The cognitive maps demonstrate the 
different ways of articulating and tackling these tensions within the indigenous movement: 
The aim and the causal paths that lead to it indicate that the indigenous organizations from 
Ecuador’s Lowlands that are represented by CONFENIAE are pragmatic and needs oriented. 
Their thinking and their behavior is shaped by the immediate needs and living conditions of 
the indigenous communities both with respect to the initial conditions as well as the future 
aims. The other concepts constituting the dominant causal paths confirm this interpretation: 
Self-help, needs-orientation and development projects (funded by the state or external actors) 
are of central importance; questions of political ideology/program play no role or a negative 
role; protests directly targeted at indigenous claims are relevant, ideologically and/or oppor-
tunistically driven protests, however, constitute a negative disruptive factor. In contrast, 
ECUARUNARI can be characterized as a macro-political and leftist organization. The norma-
tive perspective, here, is broad social and political change. A specifically indigenous agenda 
is equally important, thus constituting the main commonality between the two regional 
branches of CONAIE; but such an agenda is complemented by a strategy that is explicitly 
conceived of in macro-political terms, which has a clear leftist orientation and which seeks to 
incorporate non-indigenous forces: “Protest alliances” and a “(party-)political, ‘mixed’ organ-
ization” are important elements in ECUARUNARI’s cognitive map. Protests, on their part, 
receive an unreserved positive evaluation. 
This interpretation is confirmed by a correlation analysis that compares the patterns of thought 
of CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI as well as of Pachakutik and FEINE following the pro-
cedure outlined in Section 3. The respective cognitive maps identify Pachakutik as another 
macro-political/leftist, and FEINE as another pragmatic/needs-oriented organization (Wolff 
2008: Chap. 5.4). And, in fact, the statistical comparison reports strong and significant corre-
lations between CONFENIAE and FEINE on the one hand, and ECUARUNARI and 
Pachakutik on the other. At the same time, correlations across the two groups are considerably 
weaker.
20
 According to a frequency analysis that looks at the entries for the different argu-
ments, the ranking of the satisfaction of basic needs and self-help is higher than collective 
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 Both the Pearson and the Spearman coefficient were significant only with respect to the two pairs 
ECUARUNARI/Pachakutik and CONFENIAE/FEINE. The level of significance in both cases is at p<0.01. The 
correlation coefficients are reported in Wolff (2008: 426, Tab. 8). 
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identities and ideologies among pragmatic organizations. With respect to the second group, 
there is a well-balanced mix. Only the macro-political/leftist organizations consider the de-
velopment of programmatic alternative to be a prerequisite for social change. Conversely, 
only FEINE and CONFENIAE mention that support by the state or external (international) 
actors is a basis for and incentive for mobilization; correspondingly, the argument “coopera-




This explains the diametrically opposed reactions of the different indigenous organizations to 
Gutiérrez’ government: From CONFENIAE’s perspective, the government’s tangible offers 
in terms of cooperation and resources were more important than political differences, as pro-
found as they may be; conversely, for an organization like ECUARUNARI, it was unthinka-
ble to cooperate with a government that openly acted contrary to the general political aims, 
even if it refrained from violating material interests of the indigenous population. The cogni-
tive maps reveal that this is about more than merely corrupt indigenous leaders in the Low-
lands or a plainly opportunistic indigenous leadership in the Highlands. As CONFENIAE’s 
pattern of thought demonstrates, the Lowlands’ organizations first and foremost expect mate-
rial support (“development projects”) from the state, and, in addition, they demand certain 
chances to participate in decision-making processes that immediately concern their interests, 
i.e. they strive for the recognition as a legitimate interest group. This, however, does not in-
clude a claim to comprehensive political (democratic) participation. Against this benchmark, 
the performance of the government of Gutiérrez was not that bad. ECUARUNARI’s pattern 
of thought, in contrast, points to a clear-cut predominance of political aims and to an orienta-
tion towards comprehensive democratic participation. Against this benchmark, the govern-
ment led by Lucio Gutiérrez was unacceptable (cf. Wolff 2007: 21-27). 
Concerning the question of the general proneness of the indigenous movement to clientelist 
offers and divide-and-rule strategies, the cognitive maps reveal different weak spots for corre-
sponding regime strategies. In the case of a pragmatic/needs-oriented organization like 
CONFENIAE, tangible cooperative offers – in the absence of direct attacks on vital indige-
nous interests – facilitated the political incorporation of entire confederations “from above”.
22
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 The data: Concerning the “bases of and incentives for mobilization“ (V4), only CONFENIAE and FEINE 
feature considerably more entries for the argument “need satisfaction/self-help” (code 4.5) than for code 4.6 
“collective identity/ideology“, the proportion being 11:1 and 12:4, respectively. Only CONFENIAE and FEINE 
mention the support by the state or international actors (code 4.4) as a (positive) factor of mobilization. Regard-
ing the “preconditions of social change“ (V2), only Pachakutik and ECUARUNARI feature entries for the argu-
ment “alternatives“ (code 2.9). 
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 As regards CONFENIAE, there is an additional feature that helps to understand the proneness to clientelism 
and cooptation as it results from the inner logic of Lowlands Organizations: It is precisely the skepticism vis-à-
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In contrast, ECUARUNARI, as an organization with a more macro-political claim, was sus-
ceptible to clientelist offers that directly appealed to the indigenous communities: This way, 
the government could exacerbate the (already, if latently existing) tensions between the organ-
ization’s political leadership and the social grass roots and, thus, weaken the indigenous 
movement’s capacity to mobilize “from below”. 
In addition, the cognitive maps help to understand why the indigenous movement – CONAIE 
as well as Pachakutik – reacted to their weakening during the Gutiérrez government with an 
“indigenization” (Wolff 2008: 281-282; Beck/Mijeski 2006: 17). The differences and com-
monalities between ECUARUNARI and CONFENIAE, as represented by the two patterns of 
thought, suggested a focus on the shared indigenous identity and the specific needs of the in-
digenous population as a strategy to reunify the multiply divided indigenous movement. In 
terms of allies, this was to the detriment of any broad movement of indigenous and mestizo 
organizations – but this negative side effect appeared to be acceptable given the ambivalent 
role of non-indigenous allies even in ECUARUNARI’s cognitive map; in CONFENIAE’s 
pattern of thought they did not even exist. 
Finally, it becomes clear why, in the 1990s, the indigenous movements, was temporarily able 
to act so united and strong, only to gradually weaken and divide – and massively so during the 
presidency of Gutiérrez. In both cognitive maps, the unifying relevance of a common indige-
nous identity is combined with an equally important role of specific basic needs of the indige-
nous population. The indigenous movement was successful and relatively united when the 
task was to simultaneously fight for a basic recognition of one’s own identity by the state (in 
political and constitutional terms); for institutions and resources that serve specific indigenous 
claims; and against continuous attacks on vital indigenous interests, i.e. neoliberal cost-
cutting and structural adjustment measures. President Gutiérrez, however, refrained from such 
attacks – e.g., he did not reduce the subsidies for cooking gas – and counterbalanced the polit-
ical marginalization of one part of the indigenous movement (ECUARUNARI, Pachakutik) 
by attempting to incorporate another part (FEINE, CONFENIAE). Thus, the main factors that 
would have mobilized unified resistance of the indigenous movement did not come to the 
fore. As a consequence, the differences between the indigenous organizations from Andean 




                                                                                                                                                        
vis the participation in a political game that is perceived as being pervaded by clientelism, opportunism and 
corruption which suggests modes of informal and pragmatic cooperation with the state. 
 21 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
By representing socio-political causal relations as seen by specific actors, cognitive maps con-
tribute to an understanding of socio-political processes that are shaped by the respective ac-
tors. Thus, the interpretive schemes of the two indigenous regional confederations revealed 
different dispositions that suggested, in part, diametrically opposed, but in each case reasona-
ble reactions to identical “external” events and impulses. The cognitive maps illustrate (part 
of) the structural conditions within which CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI act – from their 
own perspective, that is.
23
 The role of the organizations’ grass-roots level and of (potential) 
political allies, the (anticipated) impact of different strategic decisions, the relation between 
options for action and aims – all this could be pictured as seen by the actor himself. This be-
ing said, cognitive maps do not replace the proper analysis of such factors and structural con-
ditions in the framework of broader process tracing. Yet, the very idea behind Giddens’ no-
tion of “methodological bracketing” (and the duality of structure and agency) is that the same 
holds true the other way around: A process analysis that coherently reconstructs macro-
political interrelations has to make plausible that the social structures that were analyzed are 
real in the actors’ minds, and that the political processes that were reconstructed correspond to 
the motives and decisions of those that drive them. For this purpose, the cognitive map is a 
promising instrument. 
Yet, the cognitive map remains a descriptive tool: An actor’s pattern of thought is represented 
in the form of causal relations. This neither confirms the presented causal links nor does it 
explain the specific behavior of the respective actor. Concerning the former aspect, cognitive 
maps are simply unsuitable. As for the latter, a cognitive map contributes important evidence, 
but only for a specific part and from a particular perspective. As the scheme refers to the per-
spective of only a single actor, the structural conditions reflected in the map, first have to be 
contrasted with an analysis of macro-social structures and processes that draws on different 
data. As the cognitive map is based only on assertions that are consciously and explicitly 
made in a given text, second, articulated strategies and aims have to be compared to assump-
tions regarding strategies, aims and practices (that are potentially routines and/or not reflected 
discursively) that can be reconstructed from observable data regarding the constitution, inter-
nal debate and actual behavior of the respective actor. Third and finally, specific events, im-
pulses for action and interactions have to be included in the analysis – such event-type factors 
will usually not appear in cognitive maps as these focus on general causal relations regarding 
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 This presupposes that the textual basis that the cognitive maps draw on reliably represent the dominant pattern 
of thought of the respective collective actor – a premise that is to be critically questioned, especially in the case 
at hand, and can, at best, be verified partially by including certain controls (see Section 3). 
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a specific problem. The endeavor of embedding micro analyses based on cognitive maps in a 
broader process tracing could only be adumbrated in the framework of the present article 
which focused on presenting and critically discussing the methodological tool as such. 
Therefore, cognitive mapping is not an alternative to other ways of analyzing data. Nor does 
this instrument solve the basic problems of qualitative political science. However, this paper 
has argued that cognitive maps can serve as a useful supplement to macro-politically oriented 
process tracing. They force us to seriously consider the specific logics of thought and action 
characterizing selected actors and to explicitly verify to what extent macro structures and pro-
cesses are reflected in the thinking of relevant actors. At the same time, they offer a procedure 
for summarizing all this in a problem-oriented illustrative way. 
As a graphic representation of individual or collective patterns of thought, a cognitive map 
remains, of course, an “artefact” constructed by the scientist (Eden 1992: 262). Nevertheless, 
if it is well-directed, it prevents the researcher to a certain extent from inferring all too directly 
from the function of the actors in the processes that are analyzed to their preferences and 
strategies in the course of process tracing. In terms of the case study at hand: A government 
may decide to apply a strategy of cooptation and divide et impera – this strategy’s success, 
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Figure 1: The cognitive map of ECUARUNARI 
 




















Arrow: positive (quasi-) causal link (“leads to“, “contributes to“, “promotes”, “enables”);
Arrow with [   ]: negative (quasi-) causal link (“inhibits”, “constrains”, “diminishes”);
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Arrow: positive (quasi-) causal link (“leads to”, “contributes to”, “promotes”, “enables”);
Arrow with [   ]: negative (quasi-) causal link (“inhibits”, “constrains”, “diminishes”);
Dashed arrow: Conditional causal link; here: missing commonalities and a missing common political project that transcends 
the rejection of the status quo makes the positive role of urban non-indigenous sectors in protest alliances and joint (party-) 
political endeavors dependent on a specific macro-political context.
Continuous connecting line: Arrows refer to both concepts connected by the line.
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